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Abstract. The control of the cryptography is more than ever a recurrent issue. As the
current international regulation does not apply in the signatory countries, the concept of
enforcing backdoors in encryption system is reborn with more strength. This paper deals
with a particular class of stream cipher backdoors. This class, under a different form,
has been widely used by the industry in the 80s and 90s in the context of the export
control rules imposed by the US to the Western countries. We propose here a new system
– called BSEA-2, with a 128-bit secret key – which is a seemingly minor modification of
BSEA-1, a system proposed in [11]. BSEA-2 illustrates, in a simple and didactic — it
has been also designed for a MSc cryptanalysis course — but efficient way the concept
of key-dependent cryptographic security. The aim is to keep control on encryption means
that a country/provider could provide to another country/client for which the secret key
are also provided. With such systems, changing the key class results in downgrading the
cryptographic security.
1 Introduction
The use of cryptography must be done with confidence in those technologies. However since
the end of the Second World War cryptography and the wider field of SIGINT have become an
extremely sensitive subject. Since the end of the 1940s, encryption means have been considered
as military or dual-use technologies — and still are — and are therefore subject to increased
control mainly by the USA and a very limited circle of allies (ANZUS and UKUSA). This control
is carried out in different ways:
– limitation or control of exports to third countries through a number of agreements or laws
(ITAR, CoCom, Wassenaar Agreement. . . ),
– military/intelligence agencies research programs and restrictions on the dissemination of
knowledge,
– use of backdoor techniques, whether software or hardware, equipment trapping or bugging
[8,16,17,20] . . .
A few recent cases (essentially Snowden revelations [8,17] for the public domain) allow us to infer
that this control is not only still in place but has been strengthened: it does no longer concern
the export of encryption technologies only but their common use in the main democracies, by
the citizens, that is in question. Since 2011, under the pretext of the fight against terrorism,
? This work has been presented in two parts at the Kaz’Hack’Stan 2019 conference in Nur-Sultan,
Kazakhstan (BSEA-2 part) and at BSides Lisbon 2019, Lisbon, Portugal (Weak key/strong key cryp-
tosystems part)
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there have been numerous political attempts to restrict or control cryptography: compulsory key
escrowing techniques and above all the concept of the backdoor, which is coming back in force
time and time again [12].
The concept of backdoor affects both the implementation (hardware, software) and the design
of the algorithm itself. The recent case of the Dual_EC_DRBG [7] is in this sense revealing be-
cause it is the best known and it shows the different level of influence (scientific, standardization,
industry). However, the few revelations linked to the Buhler affair [16] in 1995 show that this
approach has been favored since the end of the 1950s and, except for the very restricted circle of
the UKUSA agreement, almost all countries, even US allies (9 and 14 eyes, NATO...) have been
subject to this control.
It should be noted that this state context is nowadays declined in an industrial context. The
development of the IoT with embedded cryptography will probably be done according to this
model, at least for some part of the market. How to ensure that a friendly country or customer (in
the case of industrial cryptographic products) will not divert the use of this product to protect
other communications beyond the seller’s control.
In a context of high sensitivity, it is even more critical to ensure that a particular instance
of an encryption algorithm (in software or hardware form) is always identical to the publicly
announced version of the official standard and that a specially modified version has not been
inserted instead either by modifying the algorithm or by introducing particular parameters on
the fly. Modified versions of cryptographic standards are typically used on closed systems (e.g. in
pay-TV, media and gaming platforms) and aim to differentiate cryptographic components across
customers or services [2].
This article deals with a particular case of backdoor for stream encryption: that of strong/weak
key systems. In this context — which corresponds to the context revealed by the Bühler case — the
following operational conditions are assumed:
– An allied (no to say an adversary) country buys cryptographic means for its country (gov-
ernment encryption machine). It may also be equipped by a friendly nation in the context
of an allied operation.
– The algorithms are secret (customer-specific cipher algorithm), the standard communication
protocols may be modified,
– In some cases, the keys are provided by an external entity (e.g. in the case of international
joint operations or collaboration).
It is worth mentioning that BSEA-2 is a very simple example for illustrative and didactic purposes
and does not necessarily reflect the complexity of similar but more complex systems in use. It
has been also developed for pedagogic purposes in the context of a MSc cryptanalysis course.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the state-of-the-art, history and
previous work regarding backdoors in stream ciphers. In Section 3, we describe the BSEA-2
algorithm (standing for Backdoored Stream Encryption Algorithm 2 ) and address the crypto-
graphic security of this cipher. In Section 4 we explain how to break this cipher when considering
ciphertext-only cryptanalysis. In Section 5, we exploit the cryptanalysis results for BSEA-2 to
present and illustrate the concept of key-dependent cryptographic security (aka weak key/strong
key systems). Finally in Section 6 we summarize our results and present future work.
2 Context and Previous Work
The general concept of backdoor has been addressed in [6]. As for stream ciphers specifically, the
reader can refer to [11]. In this section, we just deal with existing work that are close or similar
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to those presented in this paper, illustrated with BSEA-2 and applied to the weak key/strong
key cryptosystem technique.
There is no public research work on backdooring stream ciphers, to the author’s knowledge.
It is somehow surprising when considering that from the mid-80s to the early 2000s, this class of
encryption systems has been widely studied. At the industry level (encryption machines sold to
governments, industry applications), stream ciphers were also the vast majority of systems used
throughout the world. Since, there are still used, at least partly, in payTV systems, telecommuni-
cations and satellite communication (ISO/IEC standard IS 18033-4, 3GPP encryption algorithms
UEA2 and UIA2, TETRA [TEA2]. . . where fast encryption is more than ever required), access
control systems, subway tickets, and various other security-related applications... With the rise
of IoT, stream ciphers seem also to know some sort of come back. The reasons are: speed and
simplicity of implementation in hardware, better guarantee in terms of security in the implemen-
tation and operational management of encryption operations.
As far as the intelligence world is concerned, NSA and GCHQ — among possibly a few others
— have conducted an intense research activity with regards to backdoors for this class of ciphers.
The Bühler case in 1995 [16] revealed that Crypto AG, a Swiss company and the main provider
of cipher machines for nearly 120 governments and international entities, was working closely
with the NSA to introduce backdoors in the encryption systems sold. So did a handful of other
European companies selling crypto-machines.
Even among allies (e.g. NATO), the supply of encryption means (mainly by the USA) was
accompanied by a natural defiance [1]. Consequently enforcing and maintaining control over the
cryptography supplied and preventing/managing a diversion from the standard intended use, has
been systematic.
To the author’s knowledge, there are very few publications on encryption systems — in
the context of backdoors —whose security depends on the secret key class or configuration
parameters. Let us mention those that have been identified1:
– the case of the Dual_EC_DRBG, a supposedly cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
generator (CSPRNG) using elliptic curve cryptography. For seven years it was one of the four
CSPRNGs standardized in NIST SP 800-90A (the algorithm even became part of a formal
standard endorsed by the ANSI, ISO). The backdoor was mostly based on a suitable choice
on some parameters (P and Q constants) [7,9].
– Malicious Hashing [2]. Collisions for a version of SHA-1 with modified constants have been
made possible, where the colliding payloads are valid binary files (executables, archives,
images. . . ). The malicious SHA-1 instances have round constants that differ from the original
ones in only 40 bits (on average). A similar study has been published with respect to the
Streebog hash function [21].
3 Description of BSEA-2
The BSEA-2 algorithm (standing for Backdoored Stream Encryption Algorithm version 2 ) is
based on research work, on field experience of non public cases and the analysis of the rare
available technical details and exchanges with experts in the field.
This stream cipher design (combination generator [18, Section 5.2]) is a very classical design.
It was strongly used in the from the 80s to the early 2000s for industrial and governmental
encryption systems. Most current stream ciphers in use nowadays still rely on this general core
design. BSEA-2 uses a 128-bit secret key (Figure 1). The essential difference with this design lies
1 The author would be very grateful to anyone would indicate missing references.
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in the fact that the truth table of the combining Boolean function is modified at key setup (time
instant t = 0).
Fig. 1. General structure of BSEA-2 Algorithm
The cryptographic primitives are the following:
– Four Linear Feedback Shift Registers R0, R1, R2 and R3 of respective length L0 = 23, L1 =
29, L2 = 31 and l3 = 37. Their initialization is comes from the 120 first bits of secret key at
time instant t = 0. The remaining 8 bits of the secret key (denoted K ′) modifies the initial
truth table of the combining Boolean function.
– The four feedback polynomials are the same from those used in [11]. They are primitive and
given by
P0(x) =x
23 ⊕ x22 ⊕ x20 ⊕ x18 ⊕ x17 ⊕ x13 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x3 +⊕x2 ⊕ x⊕ 1
P1(x) =x
29 ⊕ x28 ⊕ x27 ⊕ x25 ⊕ x24 ⊕ x23 ⊕ x22 ⊕ x21 ⊕ x18 ⊕ x17 ⊕ x13 ⊕ x11 ⊕ x10 ⊕ x6
⊕ x5 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x2 ⊕ x⊕ 1
P2(x) =x
31 ⊕ x30 ⊕ x27 ⊕ x25 ⊕ x24 ⊕ x23 ⊕ x22 ⊕ x21 ⊕ x20 ⊕ x16 ⊕ x15 ⊕ x13 ⊕ x12 ⊕ x11
⊕ x10 ⊕ x9 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x⊕ 1
P3(x) =x
37 ⊕ x34 ⊕ x33 ⊕ x32 ⊕ x30 ⊕ x29 ⊕ x26 ⊕ x24 ⊕ x20 ⊕ x19 ⊕ x18 ⊕ x17 ⊕ x16 ⊕ x13
⊕ x11 ⊕ x8 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x4 ⊕ x2 ⊕ 1
– The initial value of the Boolean function at time instant t is given by
0x93A0 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1)
The remaining 8 bits of the secret key modifies the initial truth table of the combining
Boolean function during the key setup.
A pseudo-random sequence (σt)1≤t≤N is produced and xored to the plaintext (encryption) or
to the ciphertext (decryption). The encryption algorithm is given hereafter in Algorithm 1 As it
is the case for the former BSEA-1 algorithm [11], this base algorithm can be modified in a large
number of variants:
– Feedback polynomials and Boolean function initial value can be changed.
– Registers R0, R1R2, R3 can be irregularly clocked according to different clocking settings.
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Algorithm 1 Pseudo-random sequence generation (base version, encryption)
Require: Secret 128-bit key K and P = (p1, . . . , pN ) a plaintext of length N
1: Key setup (R0, R1, R2, R3)← K (120 bits)
2: Combining function f ← 0x93A0
3: K′ ← K (8 bits)
4: Boolean function modification f = f ⊕ ((K′ << 8)|K′)
5: for t from 1 to N do
6: Clock registers R0, R1, R2, R3 once and output xt0, xt1, xt2, xt3
7: σt = f(x
t
3 + (x
t
2 << 1) + (x
t
1 << 2) + (x
t
0 << 3))⊕ xt0
8: end for
9: return (ct = σt ⊕ pt)1≤t≤N
– The initial value of the combining function truth table can be chosen.
While BSEA-2 is an original design, it is worth mentioning that it is however inspired by
similar backdoored stream encryption schemes that were extensively used in the 80s and late
90s at least in the Western encryption industry, for export control purposes. At that time, these
systems were proprietary and therefore the algorithm was secret and hidden in the depth of
hardware.
BSEA-2 has also larger parameters (key size, number of registers) than most of the systems
in the 80s in order to comply with nowadays equivalent computing resources for cryptanalysis.
3.1 BSEA-2 Apparent Security Analysis
BSEA-2 is a stronger variant of BSEA-1 [11] in the sense that its cryptanalysis is more difficult.
But this version enables to illustrate the concept of key-dependent security for encryption system
in a rather simple way.
In stream cipher theory, a number of cryptographic properties for the core primitives must
be achieved:
– All feedback polynomials are primitive [18].
– Feedback polynomial degrees are co-prime (L0 = 23, L1 = 29, L2 = 31, L3 = 37) [18].
– Each feedback polynomial has a prime degree (in order prevent the decimation attack [10]).
– The combining Boolean function has satisfying good cryptographic properties (value 0x93A0
provides a bent function).
The variability of the algorithm at key setup provides a false sense of cryptographic security.
Indeed, since the truth table provides a different algorithm for each secret key (with a probability
of p = 0.996), building a general cryptanalysis algorithm seems to be impossible to build. It
seems very difficult to obtain the data necessary to carry out the main known attacks:
– Noisy equations for correlation attacks [19] and fast correlation attacks [14] and similar
variants.
– Non-linear equations to be solved in algebraic attacks and similar variants [3].
The statistical analysis of the pseudo-random sequence expanded from the secret key is also a
very important cryptographic property. Since the design is most of the time secret and embedded
in a device (crypto-machine for instance or a IoT device), it is however possible to check the
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randomness properties in a black-box approach. In this respect BSEA-2 has been tested with
different suites: FIPS 140-2/STS (US NIST standard), TestUI01 [13] and DieHarder [5]. The
final conclusion is that BSEA-2 is statistically compliant with FIPS 140-2 for for 55% (all tests)
to 100% (part of tests) of the keys).
A number of statistical tests from those suites are failing for 45% of the keys which is an
issue whenever the client tests the system by himself. In fact this issue is overcome at the
implementation and management level. As the algorithms are secret, the only solution for a
client is to test them via the encryption devices directly. The latter may be provided with a
dedicated test mode or with specially designed mechanisms detecting a test and allowing, in
appearance, to choose keys for which the results comply with cryptographic standards2.
4 BSEA-2 Cryptanalysis
4.1 Military Cryptanalysis vs Academic Cryptanalysis
The general approach of the open cryptanalysis academic community consists in looking for a
unique general cryptanalysis algorithm that applies to all key instances. As far as BSEA-2-like
ciphers are concerned, this approach does not work, due to the algorithm variability with respect
to the 8-bit key K ′.
Another approach — that of specialized services in cryptanalysis —consists in considering
a polynomial number of sub-instances and in designing a specific cryptanalysis algorithm for
each instance (that run in parallel). The rise of parallel or distributed computing capabilities
enhances this approach even more. As a consequence, the backdoor design had to exploit this
parallel computing capability by dispersing or diluting weaknesses in multiple instances. Each
particular instance of the target algorithm must be weaker enough to be broken. As far as
BSEA-2 is concerned — let us recall that it is on purpose a simple enough algorithm to be
illustrative —, we consider 256 different instances with respect to the value K ′ and hence 256
different cryptanalysis programs PK′ .
Another aspect of operational cryptanalysis that differs from the academic approach lies in
the fact that operational cryptanalysis generally aims at breaking not all the possible traffic
but a significant part at least. Being able to effectively break through even a small percentage
of diplomatic/military encrypted traffic in a reasonable time (a few hours or even days) is a
considerable cryptanalytic success under real conditions.
Finally, using only encrypted text in reasonable amounts (a few kilobits to a few megabits) is
considered the only operationally viable approach in most cases (unless part of the backdoor lies
in the implementation and provides plaintext data (metadata) for encryption, that the attacker
can easily know systematically3.
4.2 Description of the cryptanalysis
The value of the Boolean function varies from one secret key to another (K ′ part). So does its
Walsh spectrum.
2 Later, in 2015, a “similar” approach has been revealed the so-called dieselgate (Volkswagen’s "defeat
device") with respect to the car industry to fool the car emission measurement tests FTP-75 from the
US Environmental Protection Agency.
3 For instance, during the 90s, for some encrypted faxes, standard communication protocols were mod-
ified allowing part of the handshake and synchronization sequence to be encrypted, thus providing a
few thousand bits of plaintext automatically
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– The Walsh transform summarizes the correlation between the Boolean function inputs and
its output value [15]
χ̂f (u) =
∑
x∈Fn2
−1f(x)⊕<x,u> and P [f(x) =< x, u >] = 1
2
(1 +
χ̂f (u)
2n
)
– The Walsh spectrum S gives the correlation for all the possible linear combinations of the
function inputs u = (u1, u2, . . . , un):
S = (χ̂f (00 · · · 00), χ̂f (00 · · · 01), . . . , χ̂f (11 · · · 11))
The weight of mask u is related to the number of input entries whose bitwise sum is correlated
to the function output. From a cryptanalytic perspective, it gives the number of register we have
to brute-force at the same time to exploit the correlation. The lower the better.
Whenever the Boolean function takes particular values at key setup, the Walsh spectrum
takes strong correlation values. For instance for the initial value f = 0x953F and K ′ = 0xD9
then f ⊕ 0xD9D9 = 0x4CE6 then
S = (0, 0,−8,−8, 0, 0, 0, 0,−4, 4, 4,−4,−4, 4,−4, 4)
For these particular values, it means that the linear combination of the inputs and the output are
equal with probability either p = 0.75 or p = 0.625. You then can write a noisy linear equation
whose unknowns are the R0, R1, R2 and R3 key bits. However for ciphertext cryptanalysis, you
have to consider the probability p0 = P (P t = 0) for a plaintext bit to be equal to 0. On average,
for ASCII coding and most languages, a conservative value is p0 = 0.55 (when considering other
encoding like Unicode, CCITTx..., ), p0 is generally higher. Moreover p0 can be larger for specific
target linguistic groups and/or different encodings.
When taking p0 into account, the noisy equation then becomes < K,u >≈ ct with probability
p′ = p.p0 + (1− p).(1− p0). We thus have either p′ = 0.525 or p′ = 0.512 which is strong enough
to perform cryptanalysis.
The last issue we have to consider lies in the fact that we must take bit xt0 xored to the function
output into account. We have then two cases with respect to the Walsh spectrum profile:
– Either χ̂f (1000) 6= 0. In this case we can recover the initial content of register R0 alone.
– Or χ̂f (1000) = 0. Then we have to recover the initial content of at least two registers (among
which R0) at the same time.
All things being considered, the cryptanalysis is then a divide-and-conquer attack [19] (at-
tacking at most three registers simultaneously). The attack complexity depends then on the
Walsh spectrum wrt K ′: it ranges from at least O(239) (registers can be recovered one by one)
and at most O(297) (the three largest registers must be recovered at the same time) with at most
6 Kb of ciphertext.
The pseudo-code of the attack is given in Algorithm 2 (case for recovering register Rj , j =
0, ..3; same attack for other registers) You can keep the ten best values ZIj for each register
(10,000 final keys to try and validate).
4.3 Cryptanalysis Results Overview
Depending on the spectrum S Tables 1 and 2 summarize the cryptanalytic effort for a 6 Kb-long
ciphertext and for two combining function initial values (0x953F and 0x93A0).
Detailed results for these Boolean function initial values or for other values are available upon
request. It is worth mentioning that the number of key classes as well as their composition may
differ greatly according to the 8-bit key chunk K ′. It is a key parameter we are going to use in
the next Section.
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Algorithm 2 BSEA-2 Cryptanalysis Algorithm AK′ (Ciphertext-only Attack)
Require: Ciphertext sequence (ct)0≤t≤N
1: ... {We suppose sequence xt0 has been recovered in a previous step except if attacking R0}
2: f = 0x953F ⊕ ((K′ << 8)|K′)
3: for Ij from 0 to 2Lj − 1 do
4: Rj ← Ij
5: for t from 1 to N do
6: Compute ZIj = x
t
j ⊕ ct ⊕ xt0 ⊕ 1
7: Store ZIj , Ij
8: end for
9: end for
10: Sort in decreasing order with respect to ZIj
11: Take the best score ZIj for the correct Ij .
12: ...
5 Weak Key/Strong Key Encryption Systems
The BSEA2 algorithm has an additional interest, besides illustrating another technique of back-
door in stream encryption. It also illustrates in a fairly simple yet realistic way the concept of
key-dependent security, still referred to as weak key/strong key cryptosystem.
Let us consider a recent historic case. For NATO countries until early 2000s, the cryptosystems
used by the alliance were provided by the USA as well as the keys. The reason lies in two critical
aspects (for the US): interoperability issues but also “security” issues. The concern was to equip
the members of the Alliance with cryptosystems BUT also to control that partial dissemination
of sensitive military technology. Until the early 2000s at least, most of the Alliance countries
had no access to the encryption algorithm description4. This situation of mutual defiance led a
number of Alliance members to maintain a national cryptographic infrastructure systematically
and to isolate purely NATO traffics from communications of strictly national interest.
The issue being raised, what about if countries decide to use alternative keys (their own keys)
and/or to use the encryption for other uses than NATO secure communications. How to manage
and control everything? The solution is to design cryptosystems whose cryptographic security
directly depends on the key class (as described in Tables 1 and 2). This is precisely what is called
“weak key/strong key cryptosystem”.
In a more general context, if a country/client decides not to comply with the rules of the
provider (NATO, IT provider...) and to use an encryption system beyond its control, then with
a high probability the system will be weakened and a far easier cryptanalysis will be possible.
Using classification in Tables 1 and 2:
– Keys from the provider will belong to the C4 class (strongest security, 2125 possible keys).
– Alternate keys will downgrade the security. With a probability of nearly 60%, chosen keys
will fall in the C0 class.
– By considering, different initials values for the combining function (base parameter), then
it is possible to finely manage the control according to the cryptographic capabilities of the
country/customer concerned.
A lot of possible scenarios can be imagined in the everyday world of IT security.
4 To the author’s knowledge, the situation might be still the same.
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Key Attack S structure # K′ %
class complexity (exemple) of keys
C0 2
37 K′ = 0x9E − S = (+4,+4,−4,−4,−4,−4,−4,−4,+0,+0,+0,+0,+8,−8,+0,+0) 144 0.5625
K′ = 0xCC − S = (−4,−4,−4,−4,+4,+4,−4,−4,−4,+4,−4,+4,+4,−4,−4,+4)
C1 2
52 K′ = 0xF1− s = (+0,+0,+8,+8,+0,+0,+0,+0,−4,+4,+4,−4,−4,+4,−4,+4) 32 0.125
C1 2
54 K′ = 0x67− S = (+0,+0,+0,+0,+8,+8,+0,+0,+4,−4,+4,−4,−4,+4,+4,−4) 24 0.093
C2 2
60 K′ = 0xAB − S = (+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+8,+8,+4,−4,+4,−4,+4,−4,−4,+4) 24 0.093
C3 2
66 K′ = 0x1D − S = (+8,+8,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,−8,+8,+0,+0,+0,+0) 4 0.015
C3 2
68 K′ = 0x71− S = (+0,+0,+8,+8,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,−8,+8,+0,+0) 12 0.046
C3 2
70 K′ = 0xDE − S = (+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,−8,−8,+0,+0,+0,+0,+8,−8,+0,+0) 12 0.046
C4 2
97 K′ = 0xBD − S = (+8,+8,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,−8,+8) 32 0.125
Table 1. Cryptanalysis results for combining initial value 0x953F
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have proposed another technique of stream cipher backdooring at the design
level. It is illustrated by a 128-bit algorithm, named BSEA-2. By design, its cryptographic security
depends on the class from which the key has been chosen. This perspective allows to explore and
illustrate in a very simple way the concept of weak key/strong key cryptosystem.
This research work intends to stress one more time on the fact that we can never trust pro-
prietary non-public encryption systems! In a context of high sensitivity, it is even vital to ensure
that a particular instance of an encryption algorithm (in software or hardware form) is always
identical to the publicly announced version of the official standard and that a specially modi-
fied version has not been inserted instead either by modifying the algorithm or by introducing
particular parameters on the fly.
In a future work we intend to explore the concept of backdoor further. The key aspects we
are currently focusing are:
– New primitives such as Non Linear Feedback Shift Registers (NLFSRs).
– Stream ciphers with memory.
– Weak key/strong key block ciphers (at the key scheduling level).
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Key Attack S structure # K′ %
class complexity (exemple) of keys
C0 2
37 K′ = 0x2E − S = (−4,+4,+4,−4,−4,−4,+4,+4,+4,+4,+4,+4,−4,+4,−4,+4) 152 0.5937
K′ = 0x2C − S = (−4,+4,+4,−4,−4,−4,+4,+4,+8,+0,+8,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0)
C1 2
52 K′ = 0x4F − S = (−8,+0,+8,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,−4,+4,−4,+4,−4,−4,−4,−4) 24 0.0937
C1 2
54 K′ = 0xEA− S = (+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+8,+0,−8,+4,+4,+4,+4,−4,+4,−4,+4) 64 0.25
C2 2
68 K′ = 0xC5− S = (+0,−8,+0,+8,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,+0,−8,+0,−8) 16 0.0625
Table 2. Cryptanalysis results for combining initial value 0x93A0
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